Republic of the
Supreme Court
SECOND DIVISION
|
LEE HIONG WEE, Petitioner, - versus - DEE PING WEE and MARINA U. TAN, Respondents. |
G.R. No. 163511
Present: PUNO, Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
|
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D E C
I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioner Lee Hiong Wee assails and seeks the nullification of the Decision[1]
dated May 14, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. SP No. 82569, declaring
null and void the Order [2] dated March 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 22, in SEC Case No. 029-03.
The facts:
At the center of the
controversy is the feud between two (2) warring groups of stockholders for the control
and management of Rico Philippines Industrial Corporation (RPIC), a domestic
corporation engaged in seaweeds export business. The corporate by‑laws provides for the
holding of a regular annual stockholders’ meeting on the first Friday of May
each year.
Records show that from the time RPIC
started business operations following its incorporation on November 15, 1990, the
family of petitioner Lee Hiong Wee had been managing and exercising control of
the firm, petitioner having, thru the years, been its president and chairman of the board, of which his wife,
Rosalinda, was also a member.
For brevity, Lee Hiong Wee and his
family members and/or allies in RPIC shall hereinafter be referred to as the Lee Hiong group.
Evidently, the foregoing close family management
set-up did not sit well for a number of RPIC stockholders. For, sometime in
July 2003 a group led by Mario T. Tan, husband (now deceased) of respondent
Marina Tan, and Dee Ping Wee (hereafter the Dee Ping group), filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a Petition praying for the holding of stockholders’ meeting, it appearing that no
annual stockholders’ meeting had been held by the corporation as mandated under
its by-laws.
In
an Order dated September 29, 2003, the SEC granted the petition and accordingly directed
the corporation’s president, or, in his default, Mario Tan or Dee Ping Wee, to
call a stockholders’ meeting not later than October 30, 2003.
After
due notice, a stockholders' meeting was held on
Among the new
board’s first acts was the passing of a resolution designating an officer-in-charge for RPIC's
plant.
On
The following events then transpired:
1. The spouses Mario
Tan and Marina Tan filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief to restrain the Lee Hiong group from implementing, and
eventually to nullify, the TRO issued by Judge Quisumbing. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79988, this petition landed to the CA's Fifteenth Division.
2. Pending resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 79988, Judge
Quisumbing, upon motion of Marina Tan, inhibited himself from SEC Case No.
029-03. He was replaced by pairing Judge Lucenito Tagle of Branch 20.
3. On
4.
On
1. xxx xxx xxx;
2. SEC Case No.
029-03 is ordered to be re-raffled … to
the RTC Judges of Imus,
3. The court a quo is directed to conduct … a
physical inventory of all appurtenant machinery, stocks and goods … at the
subject factory plant and to devise ways and means of regulating or determining
the necessity of withdrawal of stocks, goods and finished products, if any, from
the factory plant with the end in view of protecting the interests of both
parties and preserving the properties of the corporation.
SO ORDERED.
5. On
a. For Defendants [Dee Ping group] …, [to] immediately cease
and desist from discharging the functions of either as directors of the board
or officers of [RPIC] and … ordering the parties to revert to their status quo prior to October 9, 2003 with
respect to their titles and positions in the Corporation and for third parties …
to transact only with the Plaintiffs [Lee Hiong group];
b. For Defendants to deliver to the Plaintiffs the physical possession and actual control of
the plant premises of [RPIC] located at the People’s Technology Complex,
Carmona, Cavite, immediately upon receipt hereof and without any further delay;
c. For the Philippine National Police (PNP) to assist … in
enforcing this order and the ancillary writ …;
Lastly, both parties are ordered to submit … a list of
their representatives when this Court shall conduct an inventory of all the plant
assets, etc. and a proposed scheme of regulating and determining the necessity
of withdrawal of stock goods and finished products, if any, from the factory
plant for the protection of their interests and preserving the properties of
the corporation. xxx. (Words in brackets added).
6. Subsequently, Dee Ping Wee and Marina Tan went to the
CA via a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to nullify Judge Mangrobang’s order, with additional prayer for a TRO to enjoin
Judge Mangrobang from
implementing his Order and from proceeding with SEC Case No. 029-03.
This petition was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 82569 which landed to the
CA's
Second Division.
Contemporaneously, Marina Tan of the Dee
Ping Wee group filed in CA-G.R. SP No.
79988, then with the CA's Fifteenth Division, a Motion
for Reconsideration of its Decision dated February 19, 2004, claiming,
among other things, that the appellate court made certain findings that are
misleading and inaccurate.
7. Meanwhile, Sheriff Edgar Bermudez, in his
Report
dated
8. On March 15, 2004, the CA (Second
Division) promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 82569,
a Resolution adverse to the Lee Hiong
group, thereby virtually lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
issued by Judge Mangrobang. In its pertinent part, the Resolution dispositively reads:
ACCORDINGLY,
respondent Judge [Mangrobang], private respondents and all persons acting under
his authority or behalf, are hereby directed to CEASE and DESIST from continuously enforcing the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION
dated
9. On March 16, 2004, the Lee Hiong
group filed in CA- G.R. SP No. 82569
an Emergency Omnibus Motion to Avoid
Bloodshed, [4]
therein praying that the CA (a) clarify the meaning of the TRO it issued on
March 15, 2004 or recalling it, and (b)
either dismiss the case for forum-shopping or order its consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 79988. This was followed by an Urgent
Motion for Inhibition praying for the voluntary inhibition of the
Second Division or the consolidation of the case with CA-G.R. SP No. 79988.
10. On
Shortly
thereafter, it would appear that Justice Maambong was transferred to the CA’s First Division.
11. In the meantime,
on
12. On
ACCORDINGLY, a
prohibitory as well as mandatory injunction is issued against respondent Hon.
Cesar A. Mangrobang, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the [RTC] of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 22, private respondents Lee Hiong Wee, [et al.] and all persons acting under
their authority or behalf who are hereby directed to permanently cease and
desist from enforcing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, dated March
4, 2004, issued by the respondent Judge.
Unless SEC Case No. 029-03 has been rendered moot by
subsequent events, and consistent with the resolution of the Special Fifth (sic)
Division of this Court, dated 19 February 2004, the [RTC] of Imus, Cavite,
Branch 22, is directed to proceed with the hearing of said case with deliberate
dispatch, in accordance with the Interim Rules Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-01-SC) and accordingly decide the case based on
the evidence and applicable jurisprudence. [7]
SO
ORDERED. (Words in brackets added.)
Hence,
petitioner’s present recourse urging the Court to issue a TRO to restrain implementation
of the assailed May 14, 2004 Decision of the CA (Second Division) and the
eventual nullification of the same decision. Petitioner sets forth the nature
and grounds of the instant petition, to wit:
This
is an appeal by certiorari pursuant to Rule 45.
It is within the guidelines of Section 6 of Rule 45 because the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals a quo
has decided to take cognizance of a legal controversy already pending in
the Fifteenth Division and this is “not
in accord with law or with the applicable decision of the Supreme Court”
and, moreover, the Second Division by its action “has so far departed from the accepted and unusual course of judicial
proceeding . . . .”
With
all due respect, the Second Division is subject to a Rule
45 attack because said division acted with manifest partiality (a) in its undue haste (based
upon unquestioned facts on the record) in granting
and ordering the enforcement of a TRO…;(b) in its issuing a TRO on a moot
& academic matter as unquestioned facts on record will show; (c) in its ratio decidendi which, with all
due respect, appears to have been contrived; (d) in its acting
without jurisdiction, and in its total absence of explanation
on why it acted on a case which had been litis pendentia at the Fifteenth Division and rulings by two
RTC Judges that the respondents had acquired possession
of the property through violence and retained possession
of the property through violence, ignoring
even legitimate orders of the lower court. (Underscoring in the
original, Emphasis supplied).
The recourse lacks merit.
To
begin with, the petition did not limit itself to raising only questions of law,
overflowing, as it were, with factual issues.
It bears stressing that petitioner came to this Court on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, a recourse strictly circumscribed by
the express limitation that “[it] shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth [in the petition].”[8]
From a cursory
perusal of the petition and its other supporting pleadings, it is fairly obvious that the
issues raised call for an extensive excavation of factual matters. If only on this score alone, the Court can
verily deny due course thereto. However,
in the interest of substantial justice, the Court shall nonetheless resolve on
the merits each ground of petitioner’s lament.
On ground "(a)," referring to the alleged “undue haste” which allegedly
characterized the grant by the CA on
Unusual haste
7. The
TRO issued by the Second Division in CA GR SP No. 82569 was promulgated in the
afternoon of
In gist, petitioner faults the CA's
Second Division for the "undue" or "unusual" haste attending the issuance of
the TRO in question. It may be recalled,
however, that petitioner himself earlier applied for a TRO when he commenced SEC Case No. 029‑03
on
Ground
"(b)" focuses again on the grant by the CA of the same TRO. As
argued, the appellate court issued the TRO on a moot and academic matter, intended as it
was to enjoin something already accomplished. In petitioner’s own words:
5. On
6. On
Unfortunately,
petitioner’s own documents tell a different story. Sub‑Annex "1" of
Annex "F" of the petition is the Sheriff's Report adverted to. The report distinctly
states that the implementation of Judge Mangrobang's
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is only partially satisfied – not fait accompli. In detail, the report reads:
1. That on
2. That on
3. xxx xxx xxx;
4. On the same date, the undersigned with the help of
Plaintiffs’ representatives … opened the gate of the subject premises and the
undersigned together with the Chief of Police, … and personnel of the … (PNP)
and there we saw Edmond Beronia who claimed to be the plant manager and Bong
Wee, who claimed to be in-charged of the renovation of the plant premises … and
again I handed to them a copy of the writ … but they refused to sign any
acknowledgement receipt of the writ;
5. On the same date, I turned over the physical and actual
control of the plant premises to the duly authorized representative of
Plaintiffs, Mr. Roy Pasion as witnessed by Atty. Antonio Fernando, [et al.] …
as evidenced by their signatures appearing on the face of the turnover receipt
dated March 05, 2004;
6. At the time that we entered the said premises, photographs
were taken …. These pictures faithfully
depict the actual situation when the undersigned entered the subject premises
and turned over the same to Plaintiffs’ representative;
WHEREFORE, the undersigned hereby respectfully returned
to the … to the Honorable Cesar A. Mangrobang the original copy of the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction PARTIALLY
SATISFIED, considering that physical possession and actual control of the plant
premises located at PTC, RICO Philippines, Carmona,
Cavite have been turned over to Plaintiffs save for the equipments,
machineries and goods as claimed by Plaintiffs to be missing
as shown in the attached photos. [11] (Underscoring and emphasis in
the original; words in brackets added.)
The petitioner’s grounds "(c)" and "(d)" involve the
interplay of the rules on litis pendentia and forum
shopping. In ground "(c)," petitioner would insist that the CA’s Second Division was
bereft of jurisdiction to act on CA-G.R. SP No. 82569 on the ground of litis
pendentia, because its Fifteenth Division had earlier assumed jurisdiction
over and taken cognizance of the same matters covered by CA-G.R. SP No. 79988.
Elaborating, petitioner states:
All
the circumstances of this litigation: how the Second Division has chosen to act
on a matter that it has clearly no jurisdiction on because of litis pendentia; its having kept
inexplicably quiet on the jurisdictional prerogative of the Fifteenth Division;
xxx; its having issued a TRO without notice and hearing on a moot and academic
matter …; its having fast tracked the issuance of a TRO …: all of the foregoing
have convinced your petitioner that the Second Division was minded to keep CA –
G.R. SP No. 82569 under its aegis and control, rather than allow it to move on
to the First Division as would have been the case as a result of the
reorganization of the CA effective April 12, 2004 per order of the Presiding
Justice dated March 31, 2004. (Mr.
Justice Regalado E. Maambong was the Ponente and was transferred to the First Division.)
Obviously,
the Chairman of the [2nd] Division knew during the hearing of
Similarly, in ground "(d)," petitioner avers that
Dee Ping Wee and Marina Tan knew when they initiated what would turn out
to be their original action in CA-G.R. SP
No. 82569 at the CA’s Second Division that the legal controversy therein
arose from an alleged violation by Judge Mangrobang of the Decision of the
Fifteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
79988. Yet, the two (Dee Ping Wee and Marina Tan), according to petitioner,
failed to declare in the non-forum shopping portion of their petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82569 of the pendency
with the CA’s Fifteenth Division of CA-G.R.
SP No. 79988. In the precise words
of the petitioner:
Consequently,
from the very words of [Dee Ping Wee and Marina Tan], this High Court is able
to know exactly what legal controversy was elevated … in C.A. G.R. SP No.
79988. It was a legal controversy
arising as a result of an alleged violation by the Public Respondent of the
Decision rendered by another division of the CA, which as it turns out, was the
[15th] Division. However,
what [Dee Ping Wee and Tan] failed to
inform the Second Division about when they initiated CA G.R. SP No. 79988, was
that [they] were going to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier case
in the Fifteenth Division, CA G.R. SP No. 79988 on March 8, 2004, or a mere
four (4) days after March 4, 2004, the date in which [they] filed their
petition in the [2nd] Division.
[Dee
Ping Wee and Marina Tan] definitely knew on
Litis pendentia brought to the
attention of the Second Division
Although
[Dee Ping Wee and Marina Tan] failed to inform the [2nd] Division in
their petition that the decision of the [15th] Division was not yet
final, [Lee Hiong Wee] made that overwhelmingly clear in both his written work
and his oral argument. xxx. (Words in
brackets added).
The Court is not persuaded.
The essence of forum shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same transaction and same essential
facts and circumstances, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another,[12]
implying that there is between the two cases identity of parties, rights asserted
and reliefs sought.[13]
As the Court sees it, respondents'
commencement of CA-G.R. SP No. 82569
during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 79988
does not constitute forum shopping for
the principal reason that a judgment in CA-G.R.
SP No. 79988 would not amount to res
judicata in CA-G.R. SP No. 82569. What is more, the issues presented in the two
cases are significantly different from each other. Consider: the petitions in
both proceedings impute two (2) different acts allegedly constituting grave
abuse of discretion arising from two (2) different orders, i.e., one granting a TRO and, the other, a preliminary mandatory injunction. To be
more specific, in CA-G.R. SP No. 79988, the spouses Mario Tan and Marina
Tan, as petitioners therein, ascribed grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Quisumbing in issuing his Order dated
xxx pending determination of the merits of the petition,
a [TRO] be issued enjoining [Judge Quisumbing and the Lee Hiong group] from
implementing the restraining order being questioned. Further, after due notice and consideration,
judgment be rendered SETTING ASIDE the Order dated 14 October 2003 and
declaring it to be null and void, having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion ….[14] (Words in brackets added).
In CA-G.R.
SP No. 82569, however, Dee Ping Wee and Marina Tan (respondents herein) ascribed
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mangrobang in issuing his Order
dated March 3, 2004 granting a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The prayer in CA-G.R. SP No. 82569 reads:
WHEREFORE, [Dee
Ping Wee and Marina Tan] most respectfully move that, … [the CA] shall issue a [TRO] enjoining [Judge
Mangrobang and the Lee Hiong group] from implementing the Order dated March 3,
2004 and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction dated March 4, 2004 issued
by [the RTC at Imus, Cavite, Br. 22] pursuant to such Order and from further
proceeding with the case pending consideration before [the CA] on the issue of
injunction and that after due hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued enjoining the implementation of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by [the RTC at Imus, Cavite, Br. 22] until further orders,
and that after hearing, a decision granting the Petition 1) declaring the Order
of [the RTC at Imus, Cavite, Branch 22], dated March 3, 2004 and such
subsequent issuances in furtherance thereto for being a patent nullity, the
same having been issued with manifest bias and partiality and with grave abuse
of discretion…, and 2) making the injunction permanent, prohibiting [the RTC at
Imus, Cavite, Br. 22] from further proceeding with the case. (Words in brackets
added)
Then, too, the Quisumbing Order partakes
of a prohibitory injunction, while the Mangrobang Order
of
Section 1. Preliminary Injunction defined; classes. – A
preliminary injunction is an order granted … prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It may also
require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
A prohibitory injunction, as its name
suggests, commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory
injunction commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in
the past. [15]
Here, Judge Quisumbing's
prohibitory injunction enjoins the Dee Ping group –
… from assuming the functions of either board of directors
or officer of [RPIC] and from discharging the functions and the enjoyment of
whatever benefits appurtenant to the said positions.
The parties are hereby ordered to respect the status quo
prevailing at [RPIC] prior to October 9, 2003 with respect to their titles and
positions in the said corporation as well as the possession of the subject
plant premises during the effectivity of this temporary restraining order,
while Judge Mangrobang's
mandatory injunction went much further by repeating what Judge Quisumbing’s
order prohibited and adding mandatory commands, foremost of which are the following:
2. For Defendants to deliver to the Plaintiffs the physical
possession and actual control of the plant premises of [RPIC] located at the
People’s Technology Complex, Carmona,
3. For the Philippine National Police (PNP) to assist this
Court and its personnel in enforcing this order and the ancilliary writ and to employ
all necessary means under the law to make sure that the Plaintiffs are restored
to the possession of the aforesaid plant premises ….;
Lastly, both parties … to submit to this Court within
three (3) calendar days from receipt hereof a list of their representatives
when this Court shall conduct an inventory of all the plant assets, etc. and a
proposed scheme of regulating and determining the necessity of withdrawal of
stocks goods and finished products, ….
There is more. What was before the CA's Fifteenth
Division did not involve the propriety of a writ of preliminary injunction as that
matter was still being determined by the trial court at the time said Division promulgated its Decision on February 19, 2004
in CA-G.R. SP No.
79988. Thus says the CA's Fifteenth Division:
Since
the court below, however, is still conducting a hearing on the private
respondents’ [the Lee Hiong group's] prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, it is best that we allow the court a quo to complete
its hearing so that it can make a judicious determination on the injunctive
relief prayed for in accord with law and the evidence.[16]
(Words in brackets added).
And certainly not lost on
the Court is that as early as November 10, 2003, Mario Tan, who was still then alive,
and his wife Marina - as petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 79988 - had been moving for the
dismissal of their petition owing to the mootness of the issue thereat, Judge
Quisumbing's 20-day TRO having meanwhile expired. On
In view of what may be considered as
defined dissimilarities between CA-G.R. SP No.
79988 and CA-G.R. SP No. 82569, the CA Second Division, in its exercise
of sound discretion, cannot really be faulted for denying petitioner's plea for
consolidation of both cases.
Incidentally, the occurrence of an event
strongly argues for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground of mootness
of the core issue involved. An issue
becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value. In such cases, there is
no actual substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which
would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.[18] The event referred to is the holding on
The most that could happen is that the whole process will
be overtaken by the yearly stockholders’ meeting and election of directors and
officers of the corporation as mandated by law. No director or officer of the corporation can
claim his office in perpetuity. He has
to submit himself to a yearly election if he wants to continue in the service
of the corporation. [19]
Another reason for denying due course to
petitioner's prayer
for injunctive relief lies in the remoteness of the possibility of RPIC
suffering irreparable damage consequent to the promulgation of the
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
82569. In this regard, we reproduce with approval the ensuing
sound pronouncement of the CA:
Change of management of a corporation hardly results in
irreparable injury. Any predicted injury
is speculative, and only occurs when the take-over is done by incoming officers
with malice aforethought with the idea of raiding the corporate coffers. It is, of course, reasonably presumed that
the directors … as well as its corporate officers will perform their duties and
functions in accordance with the Corporation Law and other applicable laws. Raiding
the corporate coffers and disrupting corporate operations are not included in
their functions. A private corporation
is primarily organized for profit and no director or officer in his right mind
would perform any act detrimental to this purpose.
In other words, the parties may continue with their legal
battle for control of the management without need of ousting each other in a
precipitate manner, which may be disruptive of the operations of the
corporation. A corporation … can perform routinary functions by
itself through its officers and staff.
Usually, control of management is not contested except when the
corporation becomes successful and registers a lot of profit which is probably
the case of the present corporation. xxx. [20]
While perhaps of little moment now, what
the CA advised on what should have been done to resolve what basically is an
intra-corporate controversy merits nonetheless reiteration for the guidance of
all and sundry. Wrote that court:
There
is an adequate remedy at law which is clearly provided under Rule 6 (Election Contests) of the Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under R.A. No. 8799, which
took effect on
Under
Section 4 (Duty of the court upon the
filing of the complaint), Rule 6 of the aforesaid interim rules, “(w)ithin
two (2) days from the filing of the complaint, the court, upon a consideration
of the allegations thereof, may dismiss the complaint outright if it is not
sufficient in form and substance, or, if it is sufficient, order the issuance
of summons which shall be served, together with a copy of the complaint, on the
defendant within two (2) days from its issuance”.
In
the event that the court finds it necessary to hold a hearing to clarify
specific factual matters, it shall issue an order setting the case for hearing ….. The rules also require that the hearing date
should be set …, and shall be completed not later than (15) days from the date
of the first hearing. Finally, the court
is mandated to render a decision with[in] fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
last pleading, or from the date of the last hearing as the case may be.
The
RTC should have tried the case of annulment of election with dispatch in
accordance with the provisions of A.M. NO. 01-2-04-SC and decided the case
accordingly. After receiving evidence,
the RTC can annul the election, and oust the usurper or the one illegally
elected. But due process must be
observed. If this were done right from
the beginning without resorting to the short-cut of preliminary mandatory
injunction, We would not have gone through all this aggravation. [21]
As a final
consideration, the Court notes that petitioner, in a vain attempt to further
his cause, has made much of an incident in the proceedings before the appellate
court. We refer to the fact that the former members of the CA’s Second
Division, instead of their counterpart in the First Division where Associate
Justice Regalado Maambong, the ponente
of the assailed decision, was allegedly transferred, disposed of CA-G.R. SP No.
82569. In this regard, suffice it to state that it was the Second Division
which gave due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 82569 and in fact
issued on March 15, 2004 a TRO thereat. Accordingly, it behooved the members of
the former Second Division to participate, as they did here, in the
adjudication of the aforesaid petition. Section 2 (d) in relation to Section 1
of Rule VI of the 2002 Internal Rules of the CA says so:
SECTION. 1. Justice Assigned For Study and Report.-
Every case, … assigned to a Justice for study and report shall be retained by
him even if he is transferred to another Division.
SEC. 2. Justices Who May Participate in the Adjudication
of Cases.- In the determination of the two other Justices who shall
participate in the adjudication of cases, the following shall be observed: xxx.
(d) When, in an original action or petition for review,
any of these actions or proceedings, namely: (1) giving due course; (2)
granting of preliminary injunction; xxx, shall have been taken, the case shall
remain with the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report and
the Justices who participated therein, regardless of their transfer to other
Divisions.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed decision and resolution are AFFIRMED
and the petition is DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C.
GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
(on official leave) |
|
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Regalado
E. Maambong with Associate Justices Buenaventura J.
Guerrero (ret.) and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 40-99.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 136-146.
[3] Discussion
in CA-G.R. SP No. 79988 Decision dated
[4] Rollo,
pp. 98-105.
[5] Rollo, pp. 74-88.
[6] Minutes
of the May 2004 RPIC Stockholders’ Meeting; Rollo, pp. 425-427.
[7] Penned
by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong and concurred in by Associate Justice
Buenaventura J. Guerrero (ret.) and Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr.; Rollo,
pp. 40-69.
[8]
Sec. 1, Rule 45.
[9]
See Note #22, supra.
[10] Rollo,
pp. 70-73.
[11] See
Note 2, supra.
[12] Melo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686,
[13] International School, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 131109,
[14] Rollo,
pp. 173-190.
[15] Levi Straus v.
[16] CA-GR
SP No. 79988 Decision dated
[17] Rollo,
p. 171.
[18] Vda.
De Davao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116526,
[19] CA-GR
SP No. 82569 Decision dated
[20] CA-GR
SP No. 82569 Decision dated
[21] CA-G.R.
SP No. 82569 Decision dated